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Decentralized Provision of Renewable Predictions
within a Virtual Power Plant
Yue Chen, Tongxin Li, Changhong Zhao, and Wei Wei
Abstract—The mushrooming of distributed energy resources
turns end-users from passive price-takers to active market partic-
ipants. To manage those massive proactive end-users efficiently,
virtual power plant (VPP) as an innovative concept emerges.
It can provide some necessary information to help consumers
improve their profits and trade with the electricity market on
behalf of them. One important information that is desired by
the consumers is the prediction of renewable outputs inside this
VPP. Presently, most VPPs run in a centralized manner, which
means the VPP predicts the outputs of all the renewable sources
it manages and provides the predictions to every consumer who
buys this information. We prove that by providing predictions,
the social total surplus can be improved. However, when more
consumers and renewables participate in the market, this cen-
tralized scheme needs extensive data communication and may
jeopardize the privacy of individual stakeholders. In this paper,
we propose a decentralized prediction provision algorithm in
which consumers from each subregion only buy local predictions
and exchange information with the VPP. Convergence is proved
under a mild condition, and the demand gap between centralized
and decentralized schemes is proved to have zero expectation and
bounded variance. Illustrative examples show that the variance of
this gap decreases with more consumers and higher uncertainty,
and validate the proposed algorithm numerically.
Index Terms—Decentrailized prediction, local information,
virtual power plant, prediction precision, renewable uncertainty
NOMENCLATURE
A. Indices and Sets
i,I(Il) Index and set of consumers.
l,L Index and set of subregions.
n,N Index and set of generators.
s,Lg Index and set of lines.
Nl Set of consumers buying predictions on renew-
able output in subregion l.
Si Set of predictable subregions for consumer i.
B. Parameters
w,σ2Wl Expectation and variance of Wl .
I,L Number of consumers and subregions.
N,J Number of generators and fixed demand.
cn,dn Cost coefficients of generator n.
u, t Coefficients of consumer’s utility function.
D fj Fixed demand in the electricity market.
πns,π js,πvs Line flow distribution factors.
Fs Transmission capacity on line s.
α,β0 Coefficients of function indicating the relation-
ship of electricity price and VPP demand, and
we have γ = Iα , ζ = ILα .
m Cost coefficient for certain precision level.
C. Decision Variables
Di Consumption level of consumer i, and Dceni ,D
dis
i
for centralized and decentralized schemes, re-
spectively; D is the average value.
gn Power output of generator n.
Wl Total renewable output in subregion l, a random
variable and wl its realization.
W preil Prediction of Wl for i, and w
pre
il its realization.
λ Electricity price for the virtual power plant.
εil Additive random noise in the prediction W
pre
il ,
and its variance is σ2εil .
τil Prediction precision of consumer i on renewable
output in subregion l; and τcenl ,τ
dis
l for central-
ized and decentralized schemes, respectively.
βl A signal in the decentralized algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE increasing penetration of distributed renewable en-ergy has been considered as a promising solution to
global warming and environmental pollution [1]. Despite the
potential benefits, the volatility and intermittency of renewable
energy also exerts challenges on power system operation [2].
Vast literature has been addressing this issue by stochastic [3],
robust [4], or distributionally robust [5] optimizations. When
it comes to distributed renewables, this problem becomes
more complicated: Their capacities are usually small, so it
is extremely hard for the operator to detect and prepare for
their uncertainty beforehand [6]. Facing these obstacles, there
are three possible paradigms for designing energy markets to
manage these distributed resources, i.e. peer-to-peer scheme,
prosumer-to-grid scheme, and community-based scheme [7].
Virtual power plant (VPP), whose initial version was the
virtual utility in [8], is a special case of the community-
based approach, which integrates prosumers from different ge-
ographical locations. Therefore, it achieves a trade-off between
the peer-to-peer scheme and the prosumer-to-grid scheme, by
being more organized than the former one while more flexible
than the latter one which is restricted by the network structure.
The main objective of VPP is to encourage DERs’/prosumers
participation by improving their profits from the energy market
[9]. Specially in this paper, the VPP operator can help pro-
sumers gain higher profits in the electricity market by provid-
ing renewable output predictions. One practical example is the
Enco Group in Netherlands and Belgium [7]. A comprehensive
review of VPP can be found in [10].
In recent decades, VPP has captured great attention from
both academia and industry. Basically, there are two ways for
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controlling devices and transmitting information within a VPP:
the centralized approach and the decentralized approach [9].
Under the centralized scheme, there is a coordination centre in
charge of all devices and participants. Information collection
and transmission are conducted centrally, and global optimal
strategies are made. The day-ahead optimal scheduling of VPP
with energy storage, electrical and thermal energy resources,
and demand response facilities were studied in [11], and the
point estimate method was used to depict the uncertainties.
The imperialist competitive algorithm was proposed in [12] to
minimize the VPP’s operating cost under renewable output,
load demand, and market price uncertainties. The trading
of VPP in both energy and reserve electricity markets were
studied in [13] by stochastic adaptive robust optimization. The
optimal automatic frequency restoration reserve for VPP was
analyzed in [14]. The robust capability curve indicating the
allowable range of VPP was characterized in [15].
The centralized scheme can achieve global optimal solu-
tions, but when it comes to large-scale distributed energy
resources (DERs), it may become impracticable due to: 1)
Computational Burden. With an increasing number of DERs,
the centralized scheme entails a tremendous amount of data
acquisition and communication overhead. 2) Privacy. The
DERs are located in different subregions (SRs), owned by
different stakeholders with conflicting economic interests, and
they may be unwilling to provide private data for central
control. Decentralized schemes can overcome these problems.
A fully distributed ADMM-based algorithm for VPP problems
was developed in [16], and an application can be found in the
demand response program of electric vehicles [17]. Distributed
primal-dual sub-gradient algorithm was proposed for coordi-
nating DERs within a VPP via limited communication [18].
Non-ideal communication network was considered in [19]
For both schemes, the gathering, processing and provision
of information is critical as it is the foundation of the VPP
operation. The interface between the VPP and DERs was
designed with an information model in [20] so that the
VPP can make full use of the aggregated flexibility of those
resources. A general architecture as well as the Information
and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure for VPP
operation were presented in [21]. A case was tested in [22]
regarding the VPP communication system providing manual
frequency restoration reserve service. Above works mainly
focus on the physical construction of the VPP communication
system, but the information to offer, the combination of infor-
mation transmission and control schemes, and the resulting
performance are also important issues that have not been
formally studied. This topic appears to be more important with
the proliferation of distributed renewable energy. With large
scale distributed renewable energy involved whose output is
uncertain and volatile, the electricity price may fluctuate a lot
making it hard for consumers to decide their optimal demand
[23]. VPP can integrate prosumers from different subregions
(SRs) and help them improve their profits from the electricity
market [9] by services such as providing predictions of un-
certain renewable outputs. We call this uncertainty prediction
provision. Providing such information incurs a cost related to
information precision and thus leaves an optimal precision to
be determined.
This paper addresses the problem above by proposing a
decentralized uncertainty prediction provision algorithm. The
main contributions are two-fold:
1) Model. A two-level model is proposed to depict con-
sumers’ decision-making under distributed renewable uncer-
tainties. In contrast to previous research, each consumer can
purchase prediction information from the VPP to improve its
knowledge of the uncertain renewable outputs via conditional
expectation. The cost of this prediction information related
to prediction precision is characterized. In the lower level,
real-time electricity price is determined by a market-clearing
problem with volatile renewables. The relationship between
the price and the total demand inside VPP is further depicted
as a piecewise linear curve. In the upper level, each consumer
maximizes its conditional expected utility based on available
predictions, and solves for an optimal prediction precision. We
prove that providing predictions can boost social total surplus.
2) Algorithm. A decentralized prediction provision (DPP)
algorithm is presented. The region covered by the VPP is
divided into several SRs, and the consumers inside each SR
can only purchase local predictions of the renewable outputs
in that SR. Meanwhile, it can exchange information with the
VPP. The proposed decentralized scheme can overcome the
drawbacks of centralized schemes such as extensive data ex-
change and possible violation of information privacy. We prove
that the DPP algorithm converges under mild conditions, the
gap of optimal strategies between centralized and decentralized
cases has zero expectation and bounded variance. Simulation
further shows that the variance of this gap decreases with more
consumers and higher uncertainty.
The model in this paper adopts a similar structure as [24].
The differences are: This paper proposes a decentralized way
to provide uncertainty predictions within a VPP, aiming at
improving the profit of each consumer, while [24] tries to
minimize the cost of external energy imported to the system.
Reference [24] considers the privacy of consumers demand
data, and assumes that the renewable generation in each cell
is predictable, while this paper focuses on the privacy of
renewable output data in each subregion taking into account
the renewable uncertainty. Reference [24] proposes a dual
decomposition-based algorithm with decisions made at the cell
level, while the proposed decentralized uncertainty provision
algorithm derived from a probabilistic perspective involving
decision-making at the consumer level (corresponding to the
participants/facilities level in [24]).
In the rest of this paper, the market model and prob-
lem formulation are presented in Section II; the centralized
benchmark for optimal power consumption is introduced in
Section III; the distributed prediction provision algorithm is
developed and compared with the centralized one in Section
IV; Numerical experiments are reported in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System configuration and model setting
The problem considered in this paper involves three layers:
distribution system operator (DSO), VPP operator, and con-
sumers, as in Fig.1. The DSO clears the electricity market. The
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Fig. 1. The hierarchical market model considered in this paper.
consumers own and operate the distributed energy resources
(DERs). More accurate prediction of these DER outputs will
help improve consumers profits and is desired. However,
it could be impractical for each consumer to analyze the
renewable output data and make prediction individually since
it entails sophisticated techniques. Therefore, in our setting as
in Fig.1, each subregion submits the output data of DERs in
it to the VPP operator. The VPP operator makes predictions
and provides them back to each subregion. To be specific,
first, the VPP operator provides predictions to consumers and
consumers decide their optimal demand strategies. Then, the
DSO collects data of the real-time renewable outputs and total
demand from the VPP operator, together with data related to
other demands and generators, and clears the electricity market
centrally via problem (1).
The region covered by the VPP can be roughly divided
into L subregions indexed by l ∈ L := {1, ...,L} according to
the location of distributed renewable sources. For each SR l,
the aggregated volatile renewable output is uncertain and can
be represented as a random variable Wl in R+ with unknown
distribution. Denote by wl :=E(Wl) its expectation and σ2Wl :=
D(Wl) its variance. Each SR consists of a set of consumers
indexed by i ∈ Il := {1, . . . , Il}, and the set of all consumers
inside the VPP is I = ∪Ll=1Il . Every consumer can adjust its
consumption level to maximize its (expected) net utility, and
the demand of consumer i in SR l is Di, i ∈ Il1. The VPP
gathers the demand requirements from all consumers, which
is ∑Ll=1 ∑i∈Il Di, and purchases electricity from the distribution
power market. It is worth noting that, in contrast to traditional
retailer, the VPP does not make profit directly from selling
electricity but acts as a coordinator and provides supporting
information/prediction.
B. Market clearing model
The prevalence of price-sensitive flexible loads and volatile
output of renewable energy intensifies the uncertainty of elec-
tricity market prices, which will greatly influence the profit of
the consumers in the VPP. In this context, consumers behavior
as well as the real-time market stability has become a crucial
topic needs further investigation [9]. Here, we consider the
hour-head bidding problem as [25]–[27], and draw some in-
depth insights from a theoretical point of view.
1The consumer’s demand is determined by the consumer’s decision-
making problem (6) and we will give a detailed description in Section II-D.
Suppose there are N thermal generators indexed by n ∈
N = {1, ...,N} in the distribution electricity market. The
output of the n-th generator is gn, and its cost function is
fn(gn) = cng2n + dngn, where cn and dn are non-negative cost
coefficients. The cost of a renewable unit is usually close to
zero, and therefore is neglected here. The market minimizes
the total generation cost in (1a) subject to power balancing
constraint (1b), capacity limits (1c) and network constraints
(1d):
min
g1,...,gN
N
∑
n=1
(cng2n +dngn) (1a)
s.t.
N
∑
n=1
gn +
L
∑
l=1
Wl =
L
∑
l=1
∑
i∈Il
Di +
J
∑
j=1
D fj : λ (1b)
gn ≤ gn ≤ gn,∀n ∈N (1c)∣∣∣ N∑
n=1
πnsgn−
J
∑
j=1
π jsD
f
j +πvs
(
L
∑
l=1
Wl−
L
∑
l=1
∑
i∈Il
Di
)∣∣∣
≤ Fs,∀s ∈ Lg (1d)
Here, D fj ,∀ j = 1, ...,J represents the equivalent fixed demand
other than the purchase of VPP in the distribution electricity
market. Note that from the perspective of VPP, different from
the random renewable output, the inaccurate load forecast of
D fj is an external uncertainty, reflected in the term β0. In
general, the accuracy of hourly ahead load forecast is much
higher than that of renewable prediction [28], so we assume
D fj ,∀ j = 1, ...,J are constants and only consider the uncertainty
of renewable generation. λ comes from the dual variable of
the power balancing condition (1b), giving the electricity price
for the VPP (also for every consumer inside this VPP).
To facilitate further analysis, we first characterize the
relationship between price λ and the VPP’s total demand
∑
L
l=1 ∑i∈Il Di as a piecewise linear curve, whose particular
segment around the market clearing point is:
λ (D,W ) = α
(
L
∑
l=1
∑
i∈Il
Di−
L
∑
l=1
Wl
)
+β0 (2)
with constant coefficients α > 0, β0.
Remark: (i) Price λ as the Lagrangian multiplier of con-
straint (1b) can be solved from the KKT condition at the
primal-dual optimum of (1). It can be proved under mild
conditions (e.g., at optimum, at least one generator does not
reach its capacity limit and is not causing congestion) that the
dual-optimal λ is unique (for which we skip the proof) and is a
piecewise linear function of
(
∑
L
l=1 ∑i∈Il Di−∑
L
l=1 Wl
)
[29, p.
95]. Such a piecewise linear structure is also observed in power
market literature, e.g., [25]. (ii) Since one VPP only accounts
for a small fraction of the grid’s total load, it is reasonable
to assume that (1) has a fixed set of binding constraints
at optimum, despite the varying renewable generation and
demand of the VPP. Therefore, λ stays in the same segment
of the piecewise linear curve, whose coefficients α , β0 can be
determined a priori from historical data. (iii) We assume that
the total demand ∑Ll=1 ∑i∈Il Di is sufficiently higher than the
total renewable output ∑Ll=1 Wl , which keeps λ (D,W ) positive.
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C. Prediction information of renewable sources
As mentioned above, the renewable outputs W1, . . . ,WL are
random variables, and thus, the electricity price λ (D,W )
is also volatile and uncertain. The VPP may try to offer
prediction of the output of renewable units W1, . . . ,WL to
help consumers enhance their profits. Consumers need to pay
for this information, and Nl is the set of consumers buying
predictions on renewable output in SR l. If consumer i buys
the information for SR l, then it will get a forecast of Wl
from W preil = Wl + εil , where εil is additive random noise.
W preil is also a random variable, and w
pre
il is the actual forecast
consumer i ∈Nl gets. We assume:
A1: Each SR has the same number of identical consumers,
i.e., Il = I for all l = 1, . . . ,L.
A2: {εil : i ∈ Nl} are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.), each εil has zero expectation and is independent
of Wl . Denote by σ2εil the variance of noise εil .
Although different SRs can have different numbers of con-
sumers and the consumers inside each SR may also be het-
erogeneous, we make assumption A1 to derive a theoretically
sound result. In practice, we can adjust the region division so
that every SR has an equal number of consumers as well as a
representative to model all the consumers inside it.
Consumer i utilizes wpreil to improve its knowledge about
Wl . It is well known that conditional expectation E[Wl |W preil =
wpreil ] is the best estimator of Wl [30, p. 346], which, however,
may be a complicated nonlinear function of wpreil if (Wl ,W
pre
il )
is not subject to bivariate normal distribution [31]. Therefore,
in this paper we adopt the best linear estimator of Wl as2
E[Wl |W preil = w
pre
il ] = A1i,l +A2i,lw
pre
il
where A1i,l and A2i,l are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 1.
A2i,l =
σ2Wl
σ2Wl
+σ2εil
, A1i,l = (1−A2i,l)wl (3)
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Appendix.A, and it
is indeed consistent with known results about the best linear
estimator, e.g., [31]. When σ2εil → ∞, we have E[Wl |W
pre
il =
wpreil ] = wl . It means that the VPP’s forecasting technique
is poor and the prediction wpreil offers no information, so
the consumer simply uses the expected renewable output.
With higher penetration of renewables, forecasting plays an
increasingly important role in enhancing consumers’ profits.
However, improving the precision of the forecasts from VPP
may generate costs, which will be split among the consumers.
To depict this cost, we borrow the concept of prediction
precision in economics [32] defined as follows. with the related
cost given in (5).
Definition 1. (Prediction precision [32]) The coefficient A2i,l
in Lemma 1 is formally defined as prediction precision of
consumer i on renewable output in SR l:
τil :=
σ2Wl
σ2Wl
+σ2εil
(4)
2We still use E to denote the best linear estimator although it can be an
approximate of the actual expectation.
The smaller σ2εil is, the more accurate the prediction is. The
concept τil given in (4) decreases with σ2εil : when σ
2
εil
→ 0,
τil → 1 and we have W preil = Wl which is the most accurate
case; when σ2εil → ∞, τil → 0 and we have W
pre
il ≈ εil which
is the most inaccurate case. τil varies in [0,1] and a larger τil
indicates a higher prediction precision. Improving prediction
technique may incur costs [32], which is paid by all consumers
in Nl and given by
hl(τil) :=
m̌
σ2Wl
τil
1− τil
(5)
where m̌ is the cost coefficient for achieving certain precision
level, and m̌ := m/|Nl |. Denote by τl := ∑i∈Nl τil/|Nl |. The
prediction cost of renewable output in SR l for each consumer
i is related to three factors, the number of consumers buying
this information |Nl |, the prediction accuracy τil , and the level
of renewable uncertainty σ2Wl . The term m̌ decreases with |Nl |,
indicating that with more consumers involved, the cost per
consumer goes down. The term τil/(1−τil) increases with τil ,
meaning that the consumer needs to pay more for a higher
prediction precision. A higher σ2Wl would make it harder to
predict the renewable output accurately so the cost increases.
D. Decision making of consumers
The demand of consumer i is Di, and it pays at the electricity
price λ (D,W ) in (2). The real-time price λ (D,W ) depends
not only on the joint consumption of all consumers, but also
on the realization of random outputs W1, . . . ,WL which is
not known to the consumers. Therefore, consumers need to
predict future renewable outputs for making their decisions.
The consumer can buy these predicitons from the VPP and
we denote by Si the set of predictable subregions whose
predictions are available to the consumer i. In other words,
the i-th consumer knows the predictions {wpreil : l ∈ Si} before
determining Di, the amount of electricity to buy. Define an
event Ai := {W preil = w
pre
il , l ∈ Si} for all consumers i ∈ I.
The utility function of consumer i is Ui(Di) = −uD2i /2+
tDi where u, t > 0 are constants. The consumer i chooses its
demand level to maximize its net utility, i.e., the utility minus
the electricity purchase cost. Let the conditional expectation
E[λ (D,W )|Ai] be the prediction of price for each consumer
i ∈ I. This leads to the following decision rule of Di, i ∈ I:
max
Di
πi :=Ui(Di)−DiE[λ (D,W )|Ai] (6)
We consider the case where there is such a large number
of consumers in the market that the impact of an individual
consumer’s strategy on the electricity price λ (D,w) is negli-
gible. It means that E[λ (D,w)|Ai] can be treated as a given
constant in problem (6) [33]. Thus, letting the derivative be
zero, the i-th consumer’s decision D∗i satisfies:
t−uD∗i =E[λ (D,W )|Ai] (7)
E. Predictable subregions: centralized vs decentralized
The choice of {D∗i : i ∈ I} will be influenced by the sets of
SRs {Si : i ∈ I} that the consumers can get predictions on. In
the following, we compare two VPP’s information provision
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Fig. 2. Centralized (left) versus decentralized (right) prediction provision.
ways: centralized and decentralized. Under the centralized
scheme, each consumer is able to know the predictions of
all the SRs from the VPP. Under the decentralized scheme,
each consumer can only get local predictions from the SR it
belongs to but can exchange some information with other SRs
via the VPP. The centralized scheme serves as a benchmark
in our analysis, which is presented in the sequel.
Centralized scheme. Suppose every consumer get predic-
tions of uncertain renewable outputs in all the SRs, as shown
in Fig.2 (left). Therefore, the predictable set Si =L for all i∈I
and Nl = I for all l ∈ L. Specifically, each consumer i ∈ I
has predictions {wpreil : l ∈ L} and expectations {wl : l ∈ L}.
This centralized scheme in Section III serves as a benchmark
for the decentralized scheme in Section IV.
Decentralized scheme. The centralized benchmark above
could be hard to implement because of: 1) Communica-
tion burden. The centralized scheme requires the information
transmission of all SRs to all consumers, which will incurs
huge challenge on the data acquisition and communication
infrastructure. 2) Information privacy. Different SR may want
to keep its data privacy, and are not willing to share all those
information with other SRs. Therefore, we consider a more
practical case where only local predictions are available, as
shown in Fig.2 (right). Specifically, the set of predictable SRs
is Si = {l} for every consumer i ∈ Il . Each consumer i ∈ Il
only has prediction {wpreil } and expectation wl of the subregion
l where it is located.
We next present a centralized model with optimal affine
decision policy based consumers as a benchmark.
III. CENTRALIZED SCHEME WITH AN AFFINE POLICY
In this section, we analyze consumers’ strategies under the
centralized scheme as well as the optimal prediction precision.
In principle, consumers’ strategy can be an arbitrary function
of their predictions. Here, we restrict the scope of this study
to the affine policies, which is commonly used in uncertain
related studies [34], [35]. Specifically, consider the following
strategy of consumer i ∈ I:
Dcen∗i := b1 +
L
∑
l=1
bl2i(w
pre
il −wl) (8)
where b1 and {bl2i : i∈I, l ∈L} are constants to be determined.
Note that {εil : i ∈ I} are i.i.d. with E[bl2iεil ] = 0 and assume
variance D(bl2iεil) is uniformly bounded for all i and l.
Consider a big group Nl of consumers so that the law of
large numbers can be applied to obtain their average demand:
Dcen∗ :=
L
∑
l=1
1
|Nl | ∑i∈Nl
bl2i(w
pre
il −wl)+b1
=
L
∑
l=1
∑i∈Nl b
l
2i
|Nl |
(wl−wl)+b1 +
L
∑
l=1
∑i∈Nl b
l
2iεil
|Nl |
=b1 +
L
∑
l=1
bl2(wl−wl)
where bl2 := ∑i∈Nl b
l
2i/|Nl | = ∑i∈Nl b
l
2i/(IL). Then, we can
get every consumer’s optimal strategy under given prediction
precision by giving the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Given prediction precision τil ,∀l ∈ L, i ∈ Nl ,
consumer i ∈ I’s optimal demand under centralized manner is
given by (8) with
bl2i =
ατil
ζ τl +u
,∀l ∈ L,
b1 =
t−β0 +
L
∑
l=1
αwl
ζ +u
(9)
where ζ = ILα .
The proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix.B. It gives
the optimal strategy of a consumer under certain prediction
precision. Together with the optimal condition (7), consumer
i ∈ I’s expected net utility is
E[πi] := E[
1
2
u(Dcen∗i )
2]
=
u
2
( t−β0 +α
L
∑
l=1
wl
ζ +u
)2 +
L
∑
l=1
α2σ2Wl τil
(ζ τl +u)2
 (10)
Note that E[πi] increases with prediction precision τil of
consumer i, but decreases with the average precision τl across
Nl . This aligns with the intuition that a consumer earns more
by having more information about renewables and earns less
if all of its competitors know more information than itself.
The optimal prediction precision of a consumer is given by
Proposition 2, whose proof is deferred to Appendix.C.
Proposition 2. Under the centralized scheme, the optimal
prediction precision for the renewable source in subregion l is
τ
cen∗
l = max
(
0,
σ2Wl −
√
2mu/(IL)/α
σ2Wl
+
√
2mIL/u
)
(11)
for every consumer i ∈ I.
Following Proposition 2, we obtain the optimal average
demand over all the consumers in Nl ,∀l ∈ L as:
Dcen∗l = b1 +
L
∑
j=1
ατcen∗j
ζ τcen∗j +u
(w j−w j) (12)
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For renewable uncertainty (variance) σ2Wl so small that τ
cen∗
l =
0, a consumer tends to make decisions just based on expecta-
tion wl . In contrast, as σ2Wl → ∞, a consumer’s best option is
τcen∗l → 1, i.e., to make as accurate prediction as possible.
Moving further, we discuss the market impact of providing
predictions. First, the concept of total surplus is introduced to
quantify market efficiency.
Definition 2. Given the renewable output wl ,∀l ∈ L and each
consumer’s demand Di,∀i ∈ Il , l ∈ L, the total surplus of the
market is the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus:
T S(D,W ) =
L
∑
l=1
∑
i∈Il
Ui(Di)−
∫ L∑
l=1
∑
i∈Il
Di
0
λ (x,W )dx (13)
If all consumers know exactly the renewable outputs wl ,∀l ∈
L, denote their optimal demands as D0i ,∀i ∈ I, and the corre-
sponding total surplus as T S(D0,W ). If no effort is devoted to
improving the prediction techniques and consumers simply use
the expected renewable output wl ,∀l ∈L, denote their optimal
demand as D1i ,∀i ∈ I, and the corresponding total surplus as
T S(D1,W ). Given a renewable output profile wl ,∀l ∈ L, the
conditionally expected total surplus is E[T S(Dcen∗,W )|W =
w]. Theorem 1 compares market efficiency of these three cases.
Theorem 1. If assumptions A1, A2 hold, we have
E[T S(D0,W )]≥E[E[T S(Dcen∗,W )|W = w]]≥E[T S(D1,W )]
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix.D. With complete
information about the renewable output, E[T S(D0,W )] rep-
resents the optimal total surplus. However, when we cannot
know the renewable outputs accurately, a total surplus loss
is incurred. By providing improved predictions using the
centralized scheme, this loss can be reduced.
IV. DECENTRALIZED SCHEME WITH AN AFFINE POLICY
A. Mechanism description
Due to the reasons mentioned in Section II-E, Decentralized
Prediction Provision (DPP) is highly desired, in which every
consumer can only get access to the predictions of local
renewable output of the SR it lies in, i.e. Si = {l},∀i ∈ Il .
In this paper, we propose a DPP mechanism in Algorithm 1,
whose information flow is outlined in Fig.2 (right). Take the
consumers in SR l for example:
Step 1: (Initialization) The VPP generates the predictions
wpreil for all i∈Il given the precision set by (19), and set βl = 0
for all SR l (the intuition of βl will be explained later).
Step 2: Every consumer in Il receives a βl and local
prediction information wpreil from the VPP.
Step 3: With βl and w
pre
il , it accordingly decides its optimal
demand Ddis∗il based on (15) and (17)
3. It also reports Fil :=
Ddis∗il −w
pre
il /I back to the VPP.
Step 4: The VPP sums up all Fil from consumers i∈ Il and
gets the result Fl for SR l. Then it further updates βl according
to Fj from all other SR j ∈ L, j 6= l, and sends the updated βl
back to consumers in SR l. This process repeats imitatively
until convergence.
3For the decentralized case, the optimal strategy and the demand of
consumers need be differentiated across SRs.
Algorithm 1: Decentralized Prediction Provision
Input: input parameters cn,dn,∀n ∈N , I, L, ε .
Output: optimal demand Ddis∗il ,∀l ∈ L,∀i ∈ Il .
Initialization: βl = 0,∀l ∈ L, k = 0;
repeat
iteration k++
VPP:
for l = 1; l ≤ L do
consumers in SR l:
for i = 1; i≤ I do
consumer i gets β kl and a predict w
pre
il .
update Dk+1il ,∀i ∈ Il by (15) (17), and
Fk+1il := D
k+1
il −w
pre
il /I,∀i ∈ Il
end
Fk+1l := ∑i∈Il F
k+1
il
end
update β k+1l by
β
k+1
l := β0 +α ∑
j 6=l
Fk+1j ,∀l ∈ L
until maxl∈L |Fk+1l −F
k
l | ≤ ε;
B. Decision in each iteration
For SR l, the relationship between its total demand ∑i∈Il Dil
and the market price λ in (2) can be represented as below. The
information related with other SRs are compressed in βl .
λ (Dl ,Wl)=α
(
∑
i∈Il
Dil−Wl
)
+α ∑
j 6=l, j∈L
(
∑
i∈I j
Di j−Wj
)
+β0︸ ︷︷ ︸
βl
Ideally βl should contain Wj for all j ∈ L, j 6= l, which
however are random and it is impossible to know their exact
value w j in advance. In Algorithm 1 we use ∑i∈I j w
pre
i j /I to
approximate w j and calculate βl . When I is large, this can be
a good approximation.
Remark: Note that in practice, there might be some cus-
tomers without consumption flexibility. In that case, denote
the set of fixed demand in SR l ∈ L as I fl , then the market
price can be represented as
λ (Dl ,Wl) = α
 ∑
i∈Il/I
f
l
Dil−Wl

+α ∑
i∈I fl
Dil +α ∑
j 6=l, j∈L
(
∑
i∈I j
Di j−Wj
)
+β0︸ ︷︷ ︸
βl︸ ︷︷ ︸
β̂l
After SR l ∈L gets β kl , it first let β̂l = βl +α ∑i∈I f Dil and Î =
I−|I fl |, then the flexible load i∈ Il/I
f
l updates D
k
il according
to (15) (17) using β̂ kl to replace βl , Î to replace I. Finally, all
consumers i ∈ I calculate Fk+1il = D
k+1
il −w
pre
il /I and submit
it to the VPP operator.
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Under a decentralized scheme, a consumer i in SR l only
has prediction information about local renewable output Wl ,
which is wpreil . Its decision-making problem is
max
Dil
Ui(Dil)−DilE[λ (D,W )|W preil = w
pre
il ] (14)
A candidate affine policy Ddis∗il is
Ddis∗il := b̂
l
1 + b̂
l
2i(w
pre
il −wl),∀i ∈ Il ,∀l ∈ L (15)
Applying the law of large numbers, with many consumers
in SR l, the average of Ddis∗il ,∀i ∈ Il is approximately
Ddis∗l := b̂
l
1 + b̂
l
2(wl−wl),∀l ∈ L (16)
where b̂l2 = ∑i∈Il b̂
l
2i/I. Then the optimal consumption level
of consumer i ∈ Il under given βl and precision τil is given
by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Given the updates βl ,∀l ∈ L and prediction
precision τil ,∀l ∈ L, i ∈ Il , the consumer i ∈ Il’s optimal
demand under the decentralized scheme is given by (15) with
b̂l2i =
ατil
γτl +u
,∀i ∈ Il ,
b̂l1 =
t−βl +αwl
γ +u
(17)
where γ = Iα .
It follows that the consumer i ∈ Il’s expected net utility is
E[πi] := E[
1
2
u(Ddis∗il )
2]
=
1
2
u
[
(
t−βl +αwl
γ +u
)2 +
α2σ2Wl τil
(γτl +u)2
]
(18)
The proof of Proposition 3 is similar to that of Proposition
1 and so is omitted here. Different from the optimal decision
under centralized scheme, here the influence of renewable
uncertainties in other SRs is reflected in the “constant” term
b̂l1. Meanwhile, we can figure out that the optimal prediction
precision of SR l is independent of the information from other
SRs. This is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. With decentralized predictions, the optimal
prediction precision for the SR l is
τ
dis∗
l = max
(
0,
σ2Wl −
√
2mu/I/α
σ2Wl
+
√
2mI/u
)
,∀l ∈ L (19)
The proof of Proposition 4 follows the same line of the
proof of Proposition 2. With the above analysis, we close this
subsection with several remarks, indicating the benefits of our
decentralized scheme:
1) The optimal value of τdis∗l is independent of βl and
remains unchanged in each iteration. This allows each SR
to determine its optimal prediction precision individually and
beforehand, without communicating with the others.
2) The proposed decentralized scheme is in accord with the
centralized scheme in two extreme cases:
• When m = 0, improving prediction technique doesn’t
incur any cost. At this time, τcen∗l = τ
dis∗
l = 1, which
means the more accurate the better.
• When m is sufficiently large, improving prediction pre-
cision is so costly such that consumers choose not to
improve prediction techniques, i.e., τcen∗l = 0 or τ
dis∗
l = 0.
C. Convergence
It has been shown in Proposition 4 that the optimal pre-
diction precision can be determined individually by each
SR. However, the optimal demand level still depends on the
information from other SRs. In this subsection, a condition
under which the DPP algorithm (Algorithm 1) converges
is given. The optimal decision at convergence point is also
revealed. Consider the following inequality:
C1: (L−2)Iα < u.
Proposition 5. When C1 holds and when every consumer in
every SR l chooses the optimal prediction precision τdis∗l as
in (19), the average demand of every SR l ∈ L in the DPP
algorithm converges to
D̂dis∗l =
t−β0 +α
L
∑
j=1
w j
ζ +u
+
α(τdis∗l −1)
γτdis∗l +u
(wl−wl)
+
γ +u
ζ +u
L
∑
j=1
α
γτdis∗j +u
(w j−w j) (20)
The proof of Proposition 5 can be found in Appendix E.
It indicates that even if the consumer in SR l has no access
to the predictions of the renewable outputs from other SRs,
its optimal decision, however, converges to a quantity that
contains such information, if Condition C1 holds.
Fig. 3. Economic intuition behind Condition C1.
Remark: We try to give an economic interpretation of
Condition C1: Recall that equation (2) shows the relationship
of electricity price λ and total demand ∑Ll=1 ∑i∈Il Di. A higher
λ is associated with more demand, which in other words
means the market is more willing to supply. Equation (2) is
actually the supply function of the electricity market and its
price-to-quantity sensitivity for each consumer is related to L,
I and α . In equation (7), the demand D∗i decreases with the
price E[λ (D,W )|Ai], which can be interpreted as the demand
function of an individual consumer with the absolute value of
the slope equals to u. Condition C1 means that the absolute
value of the slope of the supply curve is less than the absolute
value of the slope of the demand curve. When C1 holds,
the deviations of price and quantity are compressed after the
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market reactions. A illustrative diagram is given in Fig.3 and
similar phenomenon can be found in [25], which is also known
as cobweb model in economics.
D. Comparison: centralized v.s. decentralized
Given the optimal decisions of consumers with both central-
ized and decentralized predictions, in this section, we compare
the gap between them to theoretically validate the effectiveness
of the DPP algorithm.
When Assumptions A1-A2 and Condition C1 hold, we are
able to compute the optimal average demand for each SR, with
both centralized and decentralized predictions. Denote them by
Dcen∗l (given by (12)) and D̂
dis∗
l (given by (20)), respectively.
Theorem 2. For any l ∈ L, the expectation
E[Dcen∗l − D̂dis∗l ] = 0 (21)
and the variance D(Dcen∗l − D̂dis∗l ) is bounded.
The proof of Theorem 2 is postponed to Appendix F.
Theorem 2 implies that for each SR l, the DPP algorithm
can achieve the same expected average demand level as when
centralized predictions are available. The variance of the gap
between Dcen∗l and D̂
dis∗
l is bounded, implying that the devi-
ation from the optimal demand with centralized predictions
incurred by information loss would likely be well controlled.
With above, by providing a more practical local prediction
paradigm, the DPP algorithm allows each SR to operate in a
decentralized manner, while achieving an acceptable overall
market performance.
V. SIMULATION
A. Illustrative example
In this section, numerical experiments are conducted to sup-
port the theoretical results and provide some insights. First, a
simple case with 3 subregions is tested, i.e., L= 3. The param-
eters for each SR are: w1 = 300 kWh, w2 = 500 kWh, w3 = 400
kWh, and σ2W1 = 400 (kWh)
2, σ2W2 = 3000 (kWh)
2, σ2W3 =
1600 (kWh)2. We choose m = 5 $(kWh)2, u = 8 $/(kWh)2,
t = 80 $/(kWh), α = 0.003 $/(kWh)2 and β0 = 0.03 $/(kWh).
First, the performance of the DPP algorithm with different
numbers of consumers is investigated. We test the cases with
I = 90, I = 300, I = 900, and I = 3000, and the results are
shown in Fig. 4.(a)-(d), respectively. Note that Condition C1
holds for cases (a)-(c), and thus, the DPP algorithm converges
as shown in the figure. However, the DPP algorithm fails
to converge for case (d) because (L− 2)Iα = 9 > 8 = u.
This verifies that the proposed algorithm is guaranteed to
converge with a moderate number of consumers. As proved in
Proposition 5, the DPP algorithm converges when Condition
C1 holds. In other words, given the number of subregions L,
parameters α and u, the number of consumers needs to satisfy
I < u/(α(L−2)). Under above settings the DPP algorithm
converges when I < 2666, which is sufficient for most cases of
practical interests. When there is an extremely large number
of consumers, we can aggregate some of them as decision-
making coalitions.
Additionally, we observe that with more consumers, the gap
between centralized and DPP algorithms at the equilibrium
point is narrower, while the convergence becomes slower
with severer oscillation (which can also be verified in the
proof of Proposition 5, by noticing that the spectral radius
of H is monotonically increasing with consumer number I),
revealing a possible trade-off between transient and steady-
state performance of DPP.
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Fig. 4. Performance of the DPP algorithm. When Condition C1 holds, the
average demand converges; otherwise it does not.
We further analyze the impact of consumer number I and
uncertainty level σ2Wl on the gap between D
cen∗
l and D̂
dis∗
l .
We change I from 200 to 1400, and σ2Wl from 1 to 3.5 times
of their original values, for all l ∈ L. With these parameters
changing, the varianceD(Dcen∗l −D̂dis∗l ) is plotted in Fig. 5.(a)-
(b), respectively. The gaps decline with the growth of either
factor, implying that the DPP algorithm can perform better
with more consumers and higher uncertainty. Even with a
small number of consumers I and low uncertainty σ2Wl ,∀l ∈L,
the gaps are still small. In fact, two factors account for
the gap between Dcen∗l and D̂
dis∗
l : one is the gap between
optimal prediction accuracy τcen∗l given in (11) and τ
dis∗
l
given in (19). This gap decreases with growing I or σ2Wl .
The other factor is the approximation of w in Algorithm 1
using the average of predictions wil . In the centralized scheme,
IL predictions are summed up to approximate w, while in
the decentralized scheme, only I predictions are used. As I
increases, the two schemes tend to the same approximation
accuracy. Considering the trends of these two factors, the
variance D(Dcen∗l − D̂dis∗l ) declines with the growth of either
I or renewable uncertainty, as shown in Fig.5.
Besides the optimal consumption strategy above, we also
analyze the expected total profit, defined as the following:.
E
[
L
∑
l=1
∑
i∈Il
Ui(Di)−λ (D,W )D
]
−
L
∑
l=1
m
σ2Wl
τl
1− τl
We calculate the total profit of the centralized method minus
that of the decentralized one, and show the mean and vari-
ance of this difference in Fig. 6, with a varying number of
consumers I and uncertainty level σ2Wl .
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Fig. 6. Influence of the number of consumers and uncertainty on the profit.
We observe that the expected total profit of the centralized
method does not necessarily exceed that of the decentralized
one. We briefly discuss our conjecture about the reason, while
a formal analysis is left for future work. Under the proposed
settings, two main factors that may influence the total profit are
interest conflicts among consumers (which have been widely
investigated in the literature based on the Cournot model) and
renewable uncertainty. When consumers do not know the exact
value of market price and hence decide their strategies by
predictions, the associated ambiguity may offset the negative
impact of interest conflicts. If this happens, the expected total
profit of the decentralized method may surpass that of the
centralized one. As I increases, the impact of interest conflicts
starts to dominate, making the centralized method steadily
outperform the decentralzied one. From another perspective, as
σ2Wl increases, the gap between centralized and decentralized
methods wanders near zero since uncertainty dominates and
diminishes the effect of interest conflicts.
TABLE I
TIME AND NUMBER OF ITERATIONS UNDER DIFFERENT L
L 3 9 15 21 27 33
Time (s) 0.078 0.157 0.231 0.259 0.603 0.428
Iterations 3 6 9 10 17 71
To show the practicability of the proposed algorithm, we
test the cases with more subregions by letting L equal to 3, 9,
15, 21, 27, and 33, respectively. The computational time and
number of iterations needed to converge are shown in TABLE
I. Though both time and iterations grow with the scale of the
test system, they are all moderate and acceptable.
To further show the impact of proposed algorithm on market
efficiency, we change the renewable uncertainty variance from
1 to 6 times of its original value, and record the total surplus
gaps as in Fig.7. We can observe that the gaps between
complete information & centralized prediction and between
complete information & DPP are almost zero, showing that the
proposed method can achieve near-optimal market efficiency.
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Fig. 7. Total surplus gaps between complete information and no prediction,
DPP, centralized prediction.
B. Practical example
We further extend the model (6) to incorporate multiple
periods, capacity constraint, and total load requirement:
max
Dit ,∀t=1,...,T
πi :=
T
∑
t=1
(Ui(Dit)−DitE[λt(Dt ,Wt)|Ai]) (22a)
s.t. Ddowni ≤ Dit ≤ D
up
i ,∀t = 1, ...,T (22b)
T
∑
t=1
Dit = Dtotali (22c)
where λt(Dt ,Wt) at each period t is given by (2) with
Dit ,∀i ∈ I. Ddowni and D
up
i are the lower and upper bound
of the capacity limit, respectively. Dtotali is the total demand
requirement of consumer i ∈ I over T periods. With complete
information, each consumer knows exactly the renewable
output wt , so the objective function becomes
max
Dit ,∀t=1,...,T
πi :=
T
∑
t=1
(Ui(Dit)−Ditλt(Dt ,wt)) (23)
With no prediction, each consumer makes decision ac-
cording to the expected value w̄t , and the objective function
becomes
max
Dit ,∀t=1,...,T
πi :=
T
∑
t=1
(Ui(Dit)−Ditλt(Dt , w̄t)) (24)
We simulate consumers’ optimal demand with complete
information, DPP, and no prediction, respectively. Let Dtotali =
105 kWh with Ddownit = 2 kWh and D
up
it = 5 kWh. The predic-
tion accuracy under DPP is set to τdisl = 0.5. Other parameters
are the same as the benchmark case. The consumers demands
are recorded in Fig.8 and the real-time electricity prices are
displayed in Fig.9. We can find that with DPP, consumers’
optimal demand profiles are closer to the curves under com-
plete information, while the curves without prediction differ a
lot. Moreover, consumers demand with DPP is complementary
to the electricity market prices, i.e. when the price is higher
a consumer chooses to use less electricity, and vice versa.
This verifies that our proposed algorithm can provide sufficient
information for enhancing consumers profit.
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Fig. 8. Demand under complete information, DPP and no prediction..
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Fig. 9. Electricity prices under complete information, DPP and no prediction.
VI. CONCLUSION
Virtual power plant (VPP) can gather consumers from
different geographical locations and help improve their market
profits. Facing the increasing penetration of distributed renew-
ables, one desired service of the VPP is to provide predictions
of uncertain renewable outputs to its consumers. These predic-
tions can be provided either in a centralized or a decentralized
manner. Since the former one may encounter the problems
of data privacy and computational burden, a decentralized
prediction provision (DPP) algorithm is proposed in this paper,
enabling consumers to decide their consumption levels with
local predictions. We have proved that providing predictions
can boost the social total surplus. Several appealing properties
of the proposed algorithm, including its convergence guaran-
tee and statistical performance compared to the centralized
framework, have been proved. Illustrative examples validate
the theoretical results and provide some further insights: the
variance of the optimal demand gap between centralized and
decentralized schemes decreases with more consumers and
higher level of uncertainty; the total profit of consumers
exhibits the trade-off between interest conflicts and renewable
uncertainties. A practical case is also tested to show scalability
of the proposed method. Future research entails quantifying the
gap of total profit under centralized and decentralized schemes,
as well as generalizing the proposed algorithm to VPPs with
diverse facilities.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Note that {εil : i ∈ Nl} are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) and εil is independent from Wl . This implies
that E[εil |Wl = wl ] = E[εil ] = 0 and cov(εil ,Wl) = 0 for each
subregion l ∈L and consumer i∈Nl . Therefore, E[W preil |Wl =
wl ] = wl . We have:
wl =E[Wl ] =E[E[Wl |W preil ]] = A1i,l +A2i,lwl (A.1)
and with cov(εil ,Wl) = 0, it gives
σ
2
Wl = cov(Wl ,W
pre
il )
= cov(W preil ,E[Wl |W
pre
il ])
= cov(W preil ,A1i,l +A2i,lW
pre
il )
= A2i,l(σ2Wl +σ
2
εil
). (A.2)
With the above two conditions, we obtain
A2i,l =
σ2Wl
σ2Wl
+σ2εil
, A1i,l = (1−A2i,l)wl . (A.3)
B. Proof of Proposition 1
Substitute (8) into the optimal condition (7), we get
t−u(b1 +
L
∑
l=1
bl2i(w
pre
il −wl))
= E[ζ (b1 +
L
∑
l=1
bl2(Wl−wl))−α
L
∑
l=1
Wl +β0|Ai]
= E[ζ (b1−
L
∑
l=1
bl2w̄l)+β0 +
L
∑
l=1
(ζ bl2−α)Wl |Ai]
= ζ (b1−
L
∑
l=1
bl2wl)+β0 +
L
∑
l=1
(ζ bl2−α)(1− τil)wl
+
L
∑
l=1
(ζ bl2−α)τilw
pre
il . (B.1)
This must hold for all wpreil , whence
t−u(b1−
L
∑
l=1
bl2iwl) = ζ (b1−
L
∑
l=1
bl2wl)+β0
+
L
∑
l=1
(ζ bl2−α)(1− τil)wl ,
and −ubl2i = (ζ bl2−α)τil ,∀l ∈ L. (B.2)
With above equations, we can get the values of b1 and
bl2i,∀l ∈ L, i ∈Nl :
bl2i =
ατil
ζ τl +u
,∀l ∈ L, i ∈Nl , b1 =
t−β0 +∑l αwl
ζ +u
. (B.3)
C. Proof of Proposition 2
For the centralized prediction scheme, the prediction cost for
each consumer i ∈ I is ∑l∈L hl(τil) with m̌ = m/(IL). Then
∂
(
E[πi]−
L
∑
l=1
hl
)
∂τil
=
uα2σ2Wl
2(ζ τl +u)2
− m
ILσ2Wl
1
(1− τil)2
. (C.1)
Because of symmetry, τil = τl ,∀i ∈ Nl = I. Therefore, the
optimal prediction precision is
τ
cen∗
l = max
(
0,
σ2Wl −
√
2mu/(IL)/α
σ2Wl
+
√
2mIL/u
)
,∀l ∈ L. (C.2)
D. Proof of Theorem 1
First, we calculate the value E[T S(D0,W )]. Similar to (7),
we have D0 satisfies
t−uD0 = αILD0−α
L
∑
l=1
wl +β0 (D.1)
With assumption A1, definition (13) is equivalent to
T S(D,W ) = ILU(D)−
∫ ILD
0
λ (x,W )dx (D.2)
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Then
T S(D0,W )
= IL
(
−u
2
(D0)2 + tD0− α
2
IL(D0)2 +αD0
L
∑
l=1
wl−β0D0
)
= IL
u+ζ
2
(D0)2 (D.3)
From (D.1), we have
D0 =
t +α
L
∑
l=1
wl−β0
u+ζ
= b1 +
α
L
∑
l=1
(wl−wl)
u+ζ
(D.4)
Therefore
E[T S(D0,W )] = IL
u+ζ
2
[
b21 +
(
α
u+ζ
)2 L
∑
l=1
σ
2
Wl
]
(D.5)
Next, we calculate E[E[T S(Dcen∗,W )|W = w]].
E[T S(Dcen∗,W )|W = w]
=
L
∑
l=1
∑
i∈Il
U(Dcen∗i )−
∫ ILDcen∗
0
λ (x,W )dx (D.6)
where
Dcen∗i = b1 +
L
∑
l=1
bl2i(w
pre
il −wl)
Dcen∗ = b1 +
L
∑
l=1
bl2(wl−wl)
Then the expectation of the first term in (D.6) is
E[
L
∑
l=1
∑
i∈Il
U(Dcen∗i )]
= − uIL
2
(
b21 +
L
∑
l=1
(bl2)
2 (
σ
2
Wl +σ
2
εl
))
+ ILtb1 (D.7)
The expectation of the second term in (D.6) is
E[
∫ ILDcen∗
0
λ (x,W )dx]
=
ζ IL
2
(
b21 +
L
∑
l=1
(bl2)
2
σ
2
Wl
)
+β0ILb1
−ζ (
L
∑
l=1
wl)b1−ζ
L
∑
l=1
bl2σ
2
Wl (D.8)
Therefore
E[E[T S(Dcen∗,W )|W = w]]
= IL
u+ζ
2
b21 +
αIL
2
L
∑
l=1
bl2σ
2
Wl (D.9)
The first term in (D.9) is constant. The second term increases
with bl2,∀l ∈ L and thus increases with τl until τl = 1,∀l ∈ L,
at which the case with improved predictions degenerates to
the case with complete information:
E[T S(D0,W )] =E[E[T S(Dcen∗,W )|W = w]]|τl=1,∀l∈L
When τl decreases to τl = 0,∀l ∈L, it degenerates to the case
without improved predictions:
E[T S(D1,W )] =E[E[T S(Dcen∗,W )|W = w]]|τl=0,∀l∈L
We can draw the conclusion that
E[T S(D0,W )]≥E[E[T S(Dcen∗,W )|W = w]]≥E[T S(D1,W )]
E. Proof of Proposition 5
Denote by Dk+1l the average of D
k+1
il ,∀i ∈ Il . Recall that
Fk+1l ≈ ID
k+1
l −wl
=
t−β kl +αwl
α +u/I
+
ατdis∗l
ατdis∗l +u/I
(wl−wl)−wl
and β kl = β0 +α ∑ j 6=l F
k
j ,∀l ∈ L. Thus, we have
Fk+11
...
Fk+1L
= H

Fk1
...
FkL
+h (E.1)
where
H =

0 − γ
γ+u · · · −
γ
γ+u
− γ
γ+u 0 · · · −
γ
γ+u
...
...
. . .
...
− γ
γ+u −
γ
γ+u · · · 0

h =

t−β0+αw1
α+u/I +
ατdis∗1
ατdis∗1 +u/I
(w1−w1)−w1
...
t−β0+αwL
α+u/I +
ατdis∗L
ατdis∗L +u/I
(wL−wL)−wL
 . (E.2)
Since the eigenvalues of H are γ
γ+u and
γ(1−L)
γ+u . When C1
holds, the spectral radius of H is less than 1, so the DPP
algorithm converges. Let Fk+1l = F
k
l = F
∗
l and D̂
dis∗
l = (F
∗
l +
wl)/I. It is easy to obtain the value of D̂dis∗l .
F. Proof of Theorem 2
The expectation E[Dcen∗l − D̂dis∗l ] = 0 by definition. It re-
mains to prove that the variance is bounded. First, E[Dcen∗l −
D̂dis∗l ] = 0 implies D(D
cen∗
l − D̂dis∗l ) = E[(D̂dis∗l − Dcen∗l )2].
Continuing from this, the expectation E[(D̂dis∗l −Dcen∗l )2] is
∑
j∈L, j 6=l
(
γ +u
ζ +u
α
γτdis∗j +u
−
ατcen∗j
ζ τcen∗j +u
)2
σ
2
W j︸ ︷︷ ︸
(E.1.a)
+
(
γ−ζ
ζ +u
α
γτdis∗l +u
+
ατdis∗l
γτdis∗l +u
−
ατcen∗l
ζ τcen∗l +u
)2
σ
2
Wl︸ ︷︷ ︸
(E.1.b)
. (E.1)
The term (E.1.a) equals to(
γ +u
ζ +u
α
u
)2
σ
2
W j , when 0≤ σ
2
W j < τ̄1
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(
αγσ2W j +u
√
2mu
IL
)2
(ζ +u)2u2σ2W j
, when σ2W j ∈ [τ̄1, τ̄2)
(γ + u√
L
)2
(ζ +u)2
2m
Iuσ2W j
, when σ2W j ≥ τ̄2.
Furthermore, the term (E.1.b) equals to(
γ−ζ
ζ +u
α
u
)2
σ
2
Wl , when 0≤ σ
2
Wl < τ̄1(
α(γ−ζ −u)σ2Wl +u
√
2mu
IL
)2
(ζ +u)2u2σ2Wl
, when σ2Wl ∈ [τ̄1, τ̄2)
[γ−ζ +u(
√
1/L−1)]2
(ζ +u)2
2m
Iuσ2Wl
, when σ2Wl ≥ τ̄2
where τ̄1 :=
√
2mu/(IL)/α , and τ̄2 :=
√
2mu/(I)/α .
For any σW j in the first and second categories, the bounded-
ness of σ2W j implies the boundedness of the corresponding term
in (E.1). For any σW j in the third category, the corresponding
term in (E.1) decreases with increasing σW j and is therefore
also bounded. Thus, the variance D(Dcen∗l −D̂dis∗l ) is bounded.
